The Concept of PIM

The past two decades have seen a big emphasis on addressing the management dimensions of irrigation. Massive investments were made in upgrading the physical systems so they would be easier to manage: lining of canals, adding more control structures and measuring devices. Training was also emphasized, with many technical courses developed for in-service training of irrigation staff. And the farmers' role was also recognized. They were encouraged to form informal groups at the lowest levels of the system to promote better water management through rotations and regular cleaning of the tertiary canal network. But this management focus did not address the more fundamental issue of who should manage the irrigation systems. We just assumed that management of the main and secondary canals should be in the hands of government. There was never a serious suggestion that the farmers should -- or even could -- become the managers. But that is precisely what we are discussing in this seminar. We are talking about the water users becoming the managers. This is the message of PIM.

The Mexican Origins of PIM.

The concept of PIM, in the sense we are using the term in this seminar, can be traced to Mexico. In the mid 1980s when Mexico was in the throes of a debt crisis, the government was broke. The large irrigation districts under Federal control suffered as maintenance was deferred and the productivity of unpaid, demoralized engineering staff declined. Out of necessity, the government reorganized the state irrigation agency to create the National Water Commission, or CNA in its Spanish acronym, with a mandate to turn over the management of the irrigation districts to associations of users created specially for this purpose. It should not be surprising that this policy decision took place in 1989, the same year that the centralized economies of the Soviet Union began to break up. The world was, and still is discovering ways of tapping the management skill of users rather than relying on government managers.

In 1990, Mexico transferred the first irrigation district to the users. By 1995, more than 2/3 of the country's 3.2 million ha network -- divided into 80 irrigation districts, had been transferred to 316 irrigation associations. The transfer program was initially in the most productive irrigation districts, which were best organized and with the most commercially oriented farmers. The most important criterion for selecting districts was the potential of the user organization to become financially self-sufficient, with users paying the fees to cover the costs of operations, maintenance, and administration.

What could the government offer the farmers as an incentive to accept higher costs for their irrigation? In fact, there was a carrot as well as a stick. The carrot was management autonomy. The farmers would be free to set their own rules for when to clean the canals, how to distribute the water, and which technical staff to employ for this purpose. The canal would be theirs on a 20-year concession, which is in practice a transfer of ownership.

But there was also a "stick". If farmers refused to take over management, the government could offer no assurance that the canal network could be kept in repair. The government in effect threatened to default on its conventional understanding with farmers regarding levels of subsidy in the irrigation sector because it no longer had the financial means to do so. The government, however, also promised and provided technical, organizational, and legal assistance in realizing the transfer. Many farmers, and particularly the commercially oriented ones, could not accept the risk that the irrigation infrastructure might collapse. They preferred to take over the management, and with a few exceptions, they haven't looked back. They are paying much more for their water without the government subsidy, but the reliability and responsiveness of their new management structure is well worth the price. For them it is a "win" situation, and for the government as well.

The Turkey Case. The case of Turkey is emerging as another example of dramatically rapid transfer of management responsibility from the government to farmers. In 1993, partly in response to the success of Mexico's transfer program, and motivated also be a mandate to streamline the Department of State Hydraulic Works (DSI), the Accelerated Transfer Program (ATP) was launched. Under this program, the DSI is actively encouraging farmers to form a legal entity, an association, to take over management of the system from the government. The newly formed associations receive their water supply from the DSI just below the headworks, or from branch canals in large schemes, and from this point the farmers manage their own affairs. In return, they pay no water fee to the government, and receive some technical and financial assistance in maintaining the secondary canals within the system. This is a case of genuine management transfer, but with continuing subsidies from the state during the transition phase.

The Philippines Case. The PIM program in the Philippines dates back to 1975. The cornerstone of the program is the revival of farmers' traditional role in constructing irrigation systems combined with the National Irrigation Agency's role in giving financial and technical assistance to farmers. Over 6200 Commercial Irrigation systems are now managed by Irrigation Associations without further financial or technical assistance from the National Irrigation Agency. However, the number of Irrigation Associations which have taken full responsibility for O&M of their systems, is still insignificant. Thus, the Philippines case is very participatory but without real transfer.

A Global Movement. We are seeing a global swinging of the pendulum away from the heavy hand of centralized states to a new emphasis on local decision-making. We might also say that the world's irrigation sector is shifting back towards PIM, recognizing that government is often over-stretched, and that with the right institutions -- the right legal framework and the right organizational arrangements -- farmers can cover many of the functions currently handled by government.