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Policy Process in Irrigation Reform

The Policy Process in Irrigation Reform:
Technology, Rural Development, and Politics

In the discussion below of the dichotomy between top-down and bottom-up approaches, the author relates the former to policy prescriptions and the latter to policy processes. After arguing in favor of the latter, he suggests possible ways and means of implementing it.

Top-Down Vs. Bottom-Up or Prescription VS. Process?

In studies advancing a top-down model, policies regarding PIM are formulated by policy institutions, such as the cabinet and the Planning Board. Formulated policies are then generally implemented by an agency whose reform may be a part of the policy. Irrigators are viewed as the recipients of the policy implementation process and they may be induced to participate in it through various mechanisms.

In the bottom-up model, irrigators organize themselves with or without consultants / NGOs. Room in the existing policy and regulations is utilized for negotiating a different relationship between irrigators and the agency. Consequently, improvement and success in some cases create a demand for more general policy change and ultimately may start the reform process.

In this model, a triangular relationship exists among policy institutions, irrigation agencies and irrigators. Irrigators as citizens can be involved in the process of policy formulation and its implementation via representative politics, public action by irrigators, public debates and contributions of labor, money and organizational capacity. Irrigators relate to irrigation agencies through formal or informal accountability and through contractual arrangements.

The characteristic differences between the triangular interactive bottom-up model and the top-down model can be captured by the phrases 'policy as process' and 'policy as prescription' respectively. To illustrate his point, the author compares two recent laws for PIM. The one from Mexico and the other from the State of Andhra Pradesh, India. Extracts from the Mexican law shows that it is an enabling instrument for irrigation reform. It creates a framework within which water users can design their own organization and negotiate their own agreements and contracts with the water supply agency. Their only obligation is to pay for water.

In contrast, the Andhra Pradesh law is prescriptive. It goes into considerable detail about the organizational characteristics of water users associations and their internal procedures. It is also clear that the government retains effective control on the organizations established under the act. Here policy can be seen as prescription.

 

Problems with Prescriptive Policies for PIM: Some Examples

A prescriptive policy approach for irrigation reform can work if two conditions are met. One is a strong government and administration with competent leadership and legitimacy towards citizens are needed. Second, policies that contain strong incentives for irrigators to participate are also necessary. These conditions, however, are not always met. Often stumbling blocks arise from within the government in contradictory ways. On the one hand, bureaucracies generally resist institutional change where their own power and prerogatives are curtailed. On the other, politicians tend to interfere with bureaucracies to advance the interests of their constituents. On the farmers' side there may be a strong divergence of interests.

The author gives field examples from India, Indonesia and Pakistan dating from the introduction of PIM in 1997 as efforts that illustrate some of these issues. These examples paint a gloomy picture of PIM implementation in practice, from which the following observations can be made.

1. In all three cases, PIM initiative did not originate among irrigators themselves, but came from outside the group.

2. In none of the three cases was there a serious effort made to understand the basic features of the local situation with regard to water management and social relations in the community. There was a strong tendency to arrange discussions with large farmers and local leaders only on motorable locations ignoring the interests and perceptions of small irrigators.

3. In all three cases, the irrigation agency was primarily interested in rehabilitating the system through construction or repairs. It is probable that institutional reform is only a stated goal, while the hidden objective may have been to mobilize new funds for physical works.

 

In the given scenario, the author makes three observations for attaining PIM policies:

1. Involvement of irrigation staff in the reform process can be done in either a negative or positive way. Adopting policies and procedures that force irrigation agencies to work differently and change their priorities is a negative way. Conversely, an under-emphasized, more preferable way to enroll irrigation engineers in the reform process is to provide them with technical challenges that will contribute to the reform process.

2. Farmer's perspectives and priorities should be the fulcrum around which policies and programs should be woven. In reality, even sociologists and anthropologists overlook the fact that 'how to organize' should follow 'what to organize'. Farmers often see irrigation as a means to an end, not as an end in itself.

3. Policy formulation and implementation need to be treated as political processes in which many interests are at stake; hence they require strategic political action to be successful.

Technical Challenges as a Part of PIM Initiatives

Since it is not possible to change irrigation management without involving irrigation engineers, the remedy lies in translating the reform into professional / technical challenges. These challenges become relevant when the self-governance part of PIM becomes a reality. The following examples illustrate several points:

1. In the establishment of intermediate storage in canal systems, 'live' examples are found in South India where tanks are part of the canal system. Intermediate storage facilitates 'hydraulic decentralization' by mitigating fluctuations and uncertainties in the supply from the main system and creating water banks for different locations downstream. Such storage can make the use of canal systems more flexible, and local governance more realistic. In terms of technical challenges, it raises many design issues with regard to size and number, location, siltation.

2. There is a tremendous scope for designing the outlet structure which connects the government- managed part of the system with the farmer-managed part. The author's research in South India suggests that field level engineers know how to tackle actual situations in terms of locally-suitable innovations, but they dare not deviate from the design standards. Thus, engineers fear being penalized where they should be rewarded for their creativity.

3. In areas where there is low-quality ground water, the canal system is essential for meeting requirements on drinking water also. In such canal-based drinking water provisions, a key challenge is from the point of view of health and sanitation.

4. The greatest technical challenge lies in the integration of works relating to soil and water conservation and irrigation. In the absence of any integration, professionals dealing with the two technologies often work outside each other's realms and at times even at cross-purposes. Bringing these two technologies and professionals together will help in linking rain water issues to irrigation.

5. Utilization of local material, say for canal lining and small dam / weir construction, is another area of challenges. It has been demonstrated that such materials are cheaper and more sustainable.

6. Drainage is yet another area which acquires greater prominence in view of mounting problems of waterlogging and sanitation. The author advocates an approach of participatory technology development.

A participatory approach to technological innovation in canal irrigation can be doubly useful. It can not only provide professional challenges to engineers, but also establish different relations and interaction patterns between farmers and engineers, thereby facilitating the acceptance of institutional change.

A Rural Development Approach To Irrigation Reform

The reasons for not replicating the positive local experiences with farmer organizations are partly due to the prescriptive nature of government policy and the lack of genuine devolution of power to local organizations. The responsibility also extends to the limited focus of the policies which are confined to irrigation water and canals, and do not view water as a farmer's livelihood. Looking at water from such a narrow angle is not conducive to irrigation reforms. Reform initiatives like PIM, therefore, need to be made part of broader efforts at integrated water resources management and rural development to be better able to address farmers' overall needs.

The key elements of this broader approach are four-fold:

1. It envisages greater integration between irrigation development and watershed development. Sustainable management of local resources is a precondition made for the availability and use of 'exogenous water' provided by the canal. Apart from providing sustainability, such an integration can bring about more efficient resource use.

2. It refers to the social dimensions of sustainable resource use. Equitable access to water is linked to the larger right to an adequate livelihood. Consequently, the approach defines a basic right for all, and delinks water rights from land rights. Thus, in strategic terms, the 'new water' resulting from efficiency gains and ecosystem development is to be allocated to the resource poor.

3. This approach advocates ecological sustainability with growth. It proposes the gradual removal of subsidies for electric power and the initiation of a progressive tariff system, volumetric water supply and cost recovery, while advocating for price support for coarse grain.

4. It emphasizes decentralized and interactive planning and decision making, which emphasizes people's scientific, resource literacy and their participatory technology development.

Coalition Politics

Interestingly, this approach incorporates elements of other reform perspectives: an emphasis on productivity growth, employment generation, resource use / efficiency, and non-subsidized pricing. This implies that it caters to the concerns of various political constituencies and brings to the fore a question of how to build a political support base for policy reform in irrigation sector. The author applies Bottrall's (1992) strategic political analysis to canal irrigation reform in South Asian context.

Bottrall foresees the possibility of broad-based movements for democratic reform of irrigation and argues that major changes on three fronts are necessary. One, reduction of the excessive powers of irrigation departments and other agencies responsible for large-scale canal irrigation. Two, the formation of agencies for long term integrated water resource planning. Three, the launching of programs in regions that were neglected in the past. He asserts that support for such an agenda might surface from a variety of interest groups and corners.

Bottrall argues that political coalitions have to be forged between non-governmental and governmental groups in society to create demand for reforms. He also suggests that the agenda of such a coalition should be broader than the sectoral interest of better management of canal irrigation systems, and focus on irrigation as part of integrated water resources management.

Conclusion: The Role of INPIM

The author's conclusions are derived from his research work in the state of South India where prescriptive policy implementation has frozen the reform process for a year due to the absence of formal political approval. This intransigence occurred because individual bureaucrats advocating for policy change made the acceptance of PIM policies a matter of chance and circumstances that could be sidetracked by the routine transfer of a lobbying bureaucrat. In short, individual lobbying efforts lack the effectiveness of a coalition of social forces that make irrigation reform its main agenda. The author sees an important advocacy role for the national chapters of INPIM in forging such coalitions.

By Dr. Peter Mollinga
Senior Lecturer, Dept. of Environmental Sciences, Wageningen Agricultural University
Nieuwe Kanaal 11, 6709 PA Wageningen, The Netherlands
Peter.Mollinga@Users.TCT.WAU.NL

Created by INPIM
Last modified 03-03-2004 06:04 PM

This Document was created on Sun, January 18, 2004 by INPIM.
Last modified on Wed, March 03, 2004.


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