Editor's Note

Following are the abstracts of three papers that were presented at the Fourth International Seminar on PIM, which was held in Bali, Indonesia from 14-19 July 1998. The abstracts below address some of the core themes of the Seminar: the effects of PIM; PIM and poverty; the balance between legal reforms and grassroots mobilization; and PIM and rehabilitation.

Dr. Muthusanigari Natarajan, Center for Water Resources, Anna University, India produced the abstracts below from the original conferences papers.

PIM AND POVERTY

The objective that the author sets for himself in this paper is to examine the impact of PIM on poverty alleviation. His examination is based on PIM experiences from all over the world.

From IMT to PIM

The history of irrigation development shows that until the early 1900s, the vast majority of irrigation was developed by users and in most cases operated through a participatory process. Decisions regarding management, operation and maintenance were taken collectively. Large and small PIM systems were created and developed in Asia, Africa, Latin America, Europe, North America and Australia.

Irrigation development increased from 40 million ha in 1900 to over 60 million ha by 1996. Much of this additional irrigation was developed by public irrigation agencies using national or donor funds. This led to a shift of control over irrigation from local water user committees to state irrigation agencies. This development continued till the 1960s. By the mid-1970s a number of irrigation researchers realized that sustainable irrigation systems required the active participation of the users. Reinforcement of this idea at various quarters in later years led to the formation of IIMI in 1984. One of IIMI's first programs was to study communal irrigation systems as well as help define the role of local users in large-scale public irrigation systems.

The lack of water users' involvement and the necessity for large subsidies for Operation and Maintenance (O&M) were a burden that governments could no longer bear. By the 1980s, countries started to implement irrigation management transfer (IMT) programs whereby irrigators were encouraged to participate in O&M. This shift has accelerated since the beginning of 1990s, and today the majority of the irrigation systems in the world have some element of local or joint management. In fact, data indicates that out of 15.6 million ha irrigated area in 11 countries in Asia, North American and Latin America, 77.8 percent of the area is either locally or jointly managed. This reflects the full circle that irrigation management has traveled: originally under local control, management was then centralized and is now in the process of returning to local management.

Inequity of Government Subsidies in the Same Countries

The vast areas of public irrigation systems present a stark contrast with areas developed by farmers. The former are highly subsidized and the irrigators have to pay very little in terms of water charges, while in the latter irrigators must pay higher water charges. In Mexico, for instance, prior to IMT, 3.3 million ha of public irrigation was highly subsidized while farmers on 2.7 million ha served by deep tubewells; farmers paid 10-20 times more. In Indonesia, prior to the IMT program, about 4.5 million ha were served by subsidized public irrigation systems, while another 3 million ha developed by users was served without any subsidy. In India, Nepal and Bangladesh, farmers using water from private sources were paying as much as 1/3 of the gross value of their crop for irrigation water, while farmers in public irrigation systems in these countries were paying as little as US $5/ ha.

Since both sets of farmers are selling their product in the same market, the farmers with subsidized irrigation can potentially secure higher net returns. Such a situation is inequitable and militates against farmers who are receiving water from non-subsidized sources.

WUAs and Local Control

Government control in irrigation systems originates as a response to the scale and complexities of irrigation systems. Moreover, it is justified on grounds of distributive justice. However, poor performance of public irrigation is accompanied by an absence of incentives for good work and prevalence of a private rent seeking officialdom. The failure of the system is most acute at the lower level of canal systems, where government supervision is not feasible at that level.

Against this background, studies of farmer managed systems have found that active participation of farmers in irrigation management improves the performance and sustainability of irrigation systems. In addition, stable WUAs often extend their activities to include other agriculture-related activities.

Government sponsored WUAs have, however, failed because officials often do not include users in the decision-making process, imposing their own programs without considering farmers' viewpoints. On the contrary, experience from many countries shows that farmers will form sustainable WUAs for activities they believe will benefit them. Therefore, irrigation officials have to deal with farmers as clients if successful WUAs are to be formed.

In contrast to the prevailing view of irrigation agencies, IMT programs in Mexico, Turkey, Colombia and China have demonstrated that WUAs can successfully take over the management of large irrigated areas. Research in all three countries has indicated that farmers are convinced that local control over O & M of their irrigation systems is worth the additional cost they have to bear after IMT.

PIM and Water Fees

In irrigation, the physical infrastructure as well as the human resources required to operate and maintain the system necessitates that the commodity has a real cost to deliver. The O & M cost of surface irrigation systems in developing countries comes to around US $20-70 / ha per season. In USA, in farmer managed systems, it varies between $43-137 / ha per season. These figures are in line with PIM systems in Colombia ($53.86 / ha), China ($41.50 / ha) and Indonesia (about $52 / ha). As against these realistic O & M charges, in many public irrigation systems in the developing countries, farmers pay as little as $2-3 / ha per season or nothing at all. In India, the irrigation committee has recommended that water charges be established at five percent of the gross income for food crops and 12 percent for cash crops. However, the actual receipts vary from one to three percent with the states of Tamil Nadu and West Bengal charging as low as 0.1 percent. On account of this high subsidy, O&M activities had to be deferred.

In developing countries like India and Indonesia, the bulk of the budget of public irrigation agencies is spent on staff remuneration and, as a result, there is hardly any funding for the O&M. Second, undervaluing by public irrigation agencies has also created a situation where rent-seeking behavior of the officials has led to widespread inefficiencies in management and no returns to the government. Third, under-pricing through a heavy dose of subsidies has continued unabated despite heavy investment in the irrigation sector during the 1960s and 1970s. So much so that prior to the IMT program in Mexico in 1989, annual subsidies for O&M cost of water delivery systems were 0.5% of GDP. High subsidies continue to be given in Indonesia, Pakistan, India etc. However, the realization that locally-managed irrigation systems can out-perform publicly managed ones, has led to a dramatic reduction of subsidies in irrigated areas where IMT is being implemented.

Impacts of the Reduction of Public Subsidies

In terms of economic reforms, the reduction of public subsidies has not been confined to irrigation but has covered the whole agricultural sector. This has led to the rising cost of irrigation and other agricultural inputs. The impacts of the removal of subsidies on a wheat farmer in northwest Mexico has increased irrigation costs from three to seven percent but returns rose from 97 to 226 percent. In fact, the security of water supply is worth the increase and this has been demonstrated by data from Turkey, where a switch to high valued crops had counterbalanced increased costs caused by the reduction of subsidies. This is especially relevant for small land holders who have more labor available per unit of land. In Bangladesh and Thailand, small land holders have demonstrated their willingness to pay more for secure water supplies to group tubewells or other PIM schemes. In short, they have been able to use PIM programs to reduce poverty rather than being impoverished by such programs.

The Role of Government in Agriculture

The sustainability of PIM programs depends on whether or not subsidies are removed from other sectors related to agriculture. Subsidies create problems and bring distortions and above all, discriminate against the poor and in favor of rich. The distortions of input-output prices caused by subsidies can be seen in the case of rice production in Indonesia, where prices of inputs and outputs are being controlled to ensure cheap food for urban workers. As a result, rice growers get 60 percent of the market value for their produce. A similar situation existed in Mexico before instituting the PIM program. By freeing the farmers from government restrictions and allowing the private sector to compete in the market, such various distortions were eliminated. As a result, some of WUAs took advantage of improved water management to switch to higher value crops.

PIM, Poverty, and Gender

PIM and Poverty

Data available from a number of countries provide documentation of increased equity, better water distribution, a reduction in conflicts and increased agricultural productivity as a result of PIM. The evidence concerning improvements in agricultural returns as a result of the implementation of PIM program in a number of countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America have also been documented.

Increased rural income from irrigated agriculture requires the appropriate policies and the appropriate kind of economic climate. For instance, Mexico implemented a highly successful PIM program covering 3 million ha out of 3.3 million ha of irrigated area in 10 years. However, due to the country's regressive economic climate, many WUAs did not achieve a significant reduction in poverty. At the same time, there were WUAs that were able to increase their income due to PIM.

PIM and Gender

In some societies, such as in some parts of Indonesia, women play the greater role in agricultural production and it is not uncommon to find them in WUA boards. Therefore, customary task differentiation along gender lines is not appropriate. The same is true of societies where men go out of rural areas to work in urban centers and women undertake agricultural activities.

Above all other reasons, there are two main reasons for involving women in irrigation projects. First, women constitute 50 percent of society. Second, it helps in attaining overall objectives of the project.

DESIGNING PIM PROGRAMS THAT ADDRESS POVERTY & GENDER CONCERNS

In order to make PIM programs address poverty and gender concerns, the following elements in such programs are needed.

WUAs: Organizational rules to be so formalized that all the users have a say in the organization.

Water Fees: It should, at least, cover the expenditure of a WUA as well as the cost of O & M of the portion managed by the WUA.

Professionalism: The WUA should be manned by professional staff accountable to the water users and hired and fired by them. active in agricultural production or where irrigation canals fulfil or supplement domestic water requirement, it is good to have women active in the WUA.

Poverty: PIM offers farmers a much better chance to

Gender: In societies where women arebenefit from a more secure water supply to reduce poverty through extensive user participation and equitable distribution of water among themselves.

By Sam H. Johnson III
Deputy Director, Consortium for International Development
8460 E. Fernhill Dr, Tucson, AZ 85750