Institutional Change and Policy Reform

Policy change requires institutional change, and this presents two problems. Firstly, there are two largely incompatible professional framework in use. The older - but still more common -f framework relies on the rational actor model of organizations: that the ``normal" organization is driven by a single set of consistent intentions, derived from a constitution written by its owners, who not only guard that constitution, but ensure that it is implemented in the most efficient way. (Is your organization like this?) Implicitly, is assumes that the typical problem is a well - structured one-no doubt about what the problem is, nor about how to solve it. This framework is superb at generating crisp sets of written recommendations, but, because it gives no handle on organizational politics and culture, on motivational problems, or on resistance to reform, is less effective at accomplishing change in difficult circumstances.

The second framework is the more modern and powerful one (it includes the former as a special case); in the wider management field, it is the more usual one. It sees the ``normal" organizations as a coalition of individuals and groups, pursuing their financial, professional, social, and even ethical concerns inside the organization; it may have strong internal political strains; will probably have evolved its own local culture; and deals as least as much with ill-structured problems (what to do about corrupt allocation of water?) as with well-structured ones (what is the best design solution to the water distribution needs of the schemes?) This alternative framework has a substantial kit of tools to back up its insights: structured techniques for the analysis of organizational politics and culture, and of the motivational factors that plague the design of changes in procedures and workload. One of its special characteristics is the different role it assigns to the consultant: that of a counselor, helping those on the ground get their act together, particularly in the context of consequential decisions (see below). It also sees behavior changes as a better measure of effectiveness than the production of written recommendations (which, however, may impress our donor-clients!).

The second problem is resistance to change and reform. People evade reform for three reasons: essentially non-professional self-interest; skepticism bout the principles and strategy of the proposed reform; and inability to frame tactics for carrying reform through. Between them, these account for the cases in which recommendations are prepared, accepted, and, mysteriously, nothing happens! The first is amenable to fairly simple remedies; buy-out of extension workers has worked wonders in some countries. Provided that the reformers are right, skepticism should be amenable to adult education techniques; this means not only making sure that staff know in detail what changes are mooted and why (even this is neglected at times), but also addressing the fact that mature professionals will have entrenched and often self-confirming theories about how the situation really is the incompetence of farmers to manage their own affairs being a notable example. You cannot deal with this by logic, since the counter position is not a logical one, it is an image of reality that needs experiential challenges, which is the core of adult education.

Most interesting from the institutions view point is resistance that arises not from lack of will, but inability to frame a course of action to implement change in tough circumstances - the case of, say, a senior manager in an encrusted, over staffed, non-performing agricultural research bureaucracy, who wants to implement reform, but has to a face the realities of strong labor organizations, and damaging feedback through the political system if staff are made redundant, free services are ended, and so on. You cannot usefully make recommendations on how someone else should deal with one of these consequential problems, when they face dire personal repercussions of doing what is technically obviously necessary. If you want something to actually happen, you have to help them identify a course of action that they feel comfortable with and committed to; this may be more modest than you might like - but you do not have to make the harsh confrontations, or face the personal consequences if things go wrong. The choice is between realism and inaction.

The mainstream toolkit contains plenty to help and support this process: force field techniques that address the fears and perceptions of senior and influential colleagues who may be blocking change; methods for creative generation of alternative action (very effective in practice); decisional balance sheet and other approaches to consequential decision-making.

Realizing INPIM's full potential for change will make big demand on our skills for institutional and behavioral change; conventional consultant roles and skills will need to change soon.

-Peter Smith